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I. A NATION OF LAWS AND LAWSUITS
The Foreign Emoluments Clause (“Emoluments Clause”) of the U.S. Constitution is a
provision to prevent government officials from receiving payment, gifts, or any other forms of
compensation that would unduly influence their decision-making. 1 The Emoluments Clause
applies to any official of the federal government. 2 The Emoluments Clause’s express goal is to
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1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.

2

Id.
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limit the likelihood that individuals in power will have their loyalties diverted away from the
responsibilities of their office. 3
The Emoluments Clause has long remained in the background of American
jurisprudence. Infrequently litigated, the courts have dedicated little time or analysis toward its
application. 4 That changed on day one of the Trump administration in January 2017. The courts
saw a rapid influx of lawsuits, and, suddenly, the courts had their hands full with vexing
questions surrounding the Emoluments Clause. 5 The most common issue the courts faced, and
the issue that this Comment grapples with, is constitutional standing. The crux of the
controversy is determining who has standing in an Emoluments Clause lawsuit. This Comment
will highlight how parties are injured by Emoluments Clause violations and discuss how
individuals can establish standing. This discussion will argue that “competitor standing” is a
viable path to redress and highlight its constitutional importance.
Part II of this Comment will lay a detailed foundation of the Emoluments Clause, its
historical background, core mission, and modern relevance. Part III will analyze why competitor
standing is needed to fulfill the Emoluments Clause’s constitutional mandate, and Part IV will
recommend that courts treat competitor standing as a constitutional necessity. Part V will
conclude that competitor standing is encompassed by the constitutional mandate of the
Emoluments Clause.
II. PRINCIPLES OF STANDING AND THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE
The Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution has a long but empty history. 6
The Emoluments Clause’s life is bookended by two periods of tremendous activity with
longstanding dormancy in between. 7 However, introducing the concept of standing is necessary
before that discussion.

See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 361 (2009) (“[T]he delegates were
deeply concerned that foreign interests would try to use their wealth to tempt public servants.”); see also MICHAEL
A. FOSTER & KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45992, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE AND THE PRESIDENCY:
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2019) (“The Foreign Emoluments Clause’s basic purpose is to
prevent corruption and limit foreign influence on federal officers. . . .”).
3

Jacob Gershman, Lawsuit Against Donald Trump Shines Light on Emoluments Clause, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2017,
4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-against-donald-trump-shines-light-on-emoluments-clause1485204840 (referring to the Emoluments Clause as a rarely litigated passage of the Constitution); see also James
D. Johnson, Legal Front: What is the Emoluments Clause?, COURIER & PRESS (Mar. 16, 2017, 8:47 AM),
https://www.courierpress.com/story/money/evansville-business-journal/2017/03/10/legal-front-what-emolumentsclause/97634660/ (“Evidently, the Emoluments Clause has never been litigated; thus, there have not been any
interpretations of enforcement. The reality is this little-known article of the United States Constitution will now take
on a new life with a ‘former’ businessman as the current President.”).
4

5

See Johnson, supra note 4.

6

See FOSTER & HICKEY, supra note 3, at 2–5.

7

Id.
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A. TRADITIONAL STANDING PRINCIPLES
The cases outlined below wrestle with standing principles as applied to the Emoluments
Clause. Standing is a citizen’s ability to have judicial enforcement of an alleged right. 8 Standing
has three essential subdivisions. The first is “injury in fact,” which requires litigants to suffer an
injury that is “concrete” and “particularized.” 9 Second, courts require that parties state a causal
link between the injury and the alleged conduct to maintain standing. 10 To establish a causal
link, parties must show that the injury is not “the result of some third party not before the
court.” 11 Lastly, parties must show that favorable court action will “likely” redress the alleged
injury. 12
B. THE PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE
The Framers originally intended the Emoluments Clause to be an anti-corruption
measure. 13 It prevents the President or other federal officeholders from receiving a “present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or state.” 14 Emoluments
can only be accepted after the approval of Congress. 15
During the Constitutional Convention, the nation was still young and vulnerable to
European influence. 16 Accordingly, the Framers feared potential French influence on the
American political system. 17 To offset this fear, Convention delegate Charles Pinckney
proposed the inclusion of the Emoluments Clause.” 18

See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 228–29 (1988) (discussing the nature of
standing).

8

9

See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

10

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 561.

13

Teachout, supra note 3, at 361.

14

U.S CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.

15

Id.

See Teachout, supra note 3, at 361–62 (highlighting that fears of foreign influence were reasonable at the time);
cf. Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 30, 35 (2012) (“The American recipients of
these gifts showed repeated anxiety about what to do with them. The new country was trying so hard to separate
itself from courtly culture. . . .”).
16

See Teachout, supra note 3, at 361–62 (“The fear was not that Frenchmen were heathens, but that they were
strong, had no real interest in the good future of America . . . .”).

17

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 389 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“[]Pinckney urged the
necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the U. S. independent of external influence . . . .”).
18
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C. MODERN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSY

The relevance of the Emoluments Clause remained unclear for nearly two centuries.
Infrequently litigated, the Emoluments Clause appeared to be a relic of the past. 19 However, just
one day after taking office in 2017, President Trump faced his first lawsuit concerning the
Emoluments Clause. 20
Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, it became clear that the Framers possessed
tremendous forethought because several parties brought lawsuits against President Trump under
the Emoluments Clause. 21 Three of those cases demand review: Blumenthal v. Trump, 22 District
of Columbia v. Trump, 23 and Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump. 24
At the heart of each of these cases is a discussion about standing, the nature of the injury related
to an Emoluments Clause violation, and the court’s ability to redress the claimed injuries.
1. BLUMENTHAL V. TRUMP SERIES
In Blumenthal, 201 members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives
sought a declaratory judgment stating that the President violates the Emoluments Clause when he
accepts payments from foreign states, in the form of profits earned by the President's businesses,
without the consent of Congress. 25 Additionally, those 201 Members of Congress sought
injunctive relief asking the court to “enjoin[] the President from accepting any ‘present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever’ from a foreign state without obtaining ‘the
[c]onsent of Congress.’” 26 The President moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing. 27

See Matthew Walther, The Emoluments Clause is Meaningless, THE WK. (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://theweek.com/articles/864240/emoluments-clause-meaningless (“The clause has never given rise to any legal
cases of note, and it has never been defined or even meaningfully addressed by the Supreme Court.”).
19

E.g., Gretchen Frazee, How the Emoluments Clause is Being Used to Sue Trump, PBS (Mar. 28, 2018, 4:19 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/emoluments-clause-used-sue-trump (“The nonpartisan watchdog group
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington also announced a lawsuit against Trump the day after he took
office . . . .”).
20

E.g., Aaron C. Davis, D.C. and Maryland
Sue President Trump, Alleging Breach of Constitutional Oath, WASH. POST (June 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-and-maryland-to-sue-president-trump-alleging-breach-ofconstitutional-oath/2017/06/11/0059e1f0-4f19-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html.
21

22

Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d, 949 F. 3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), rev’d sub nom. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360
(4th Cir. 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020).
23

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated, 953 F.3d 178 (2d
Cir. 2019).
24

25

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50.

26

Id. (quoting U.S CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8).

27

Id.
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The plaintiffs alleged an institutional injury, arguing an impact on all Congress members
through diminished legislative power. 28 The court stated that this type of injury does not satisfy
standing requirements when a legislative remedy exists to address the injury. The injury merely
represents a diminution of political power. 29 However, institutional injuries can establish
standing when a legislator’s vote is “completely nullified.” 30
Utilizing this framework, the court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged an
institutional injury for which a legislative remedy did not exist. 31 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs established their injury by alleging that the President nullified their opportunity to
provide consent every time he accepted emoluments without first obtaining congressional
authorization. 32
This practice resembles vote nullification rather than a diminution in political power
because the injury at issue is not about the ability to legislate on the Emoluments Clause; instead,
the issue is about having the opportunity to consent before the acceptance of an emolument. 33
Therefore, whether Congress can consent after the fact through legislation is irrelevant. 34
Although the court agreed that Members of Congress cannot seek the judiciary’s aid
when they have adequate political tools at their disposal, 35 it found that Congress lacked such
tools in the present case. 36 President Trump suggested several legislative remedies, such as
voting on whether the present claims amount to violations of the Emoluments Clause, passing a
bill expressing consent or disagreement with the claimed violations, passing a joint resolution
which defines an emolument and prohibits the receipt thereof, or utilizing the appropriations
power to punish violations. 37

28

Id. at 54 (suggesting that plaintiffs are denied right to vote on approval).

29

Id. at 57 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997)).

Id. at 58; see, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1939) (upholding standing when legislators who had
been locked in a tie vote that would have defeated the State's ratification of a federal constitutional amendment
because legislators had no realistic opportunity to overturn the ratification using the political process); see also Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 788 (2015) (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–
24) (finding that state legislators had standing to challenge ballot initiative that would deprive them of their ability to
initiate redistricting because the ballot initiative “together with the Arizona Constitution's ban on efforts to
undermine the purposes of an initiative would ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by the Legislature, now or ‘in the
future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan.”).
30

31

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 62.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 63.

34

Id.

Cf. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F. 3d 19, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Congress certainly could have passed a law
forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign . . . .”).

35

36

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 66.

37

Id. at 66–67.
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Drawing on Raines v. Byrd, 38 the court held these remedies inadequate. 39 First, the court
noted that requiring Congress to pass legislation ignores the text of the Emoluments Clause. 40
The Emoluments Clause places the burden on the President to get prior consent from Congress,
and the President cannot flip the burden as to require Congress to pass legislation expressing
disapproval. 41
The court also noted that Congress’s appropriations power is inadequate. 42 Congress
cannot use its appropriations power to punish the President for accepting emoluments because no
spending programs are directly tied to the Emoluments Clause. 43 The court stated that the
appropriations powers are only adequate when withholding funds would directly remedy the
situation. 44
The court also set aside the impeachment remedy as inadequate. 45 It labeled this remedy
as “extreme” and inappropriate. 46 In the court’s view, the impeachment process is a remedy of
last resort and cannot function as a sole remedy. 47 Lastly, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
adequately established traceability as the “alleged injury is therefore directly traceable to the
President's alleged failure to seek Congressional consent.” 48 Ultimately, the district court held
that the plaintiffs established standing. 49
On an interlocutory appeal, the district court’s decision was reversed. 50 The court of
appeals concluded that the lower court had misread Raines. 51 The appellate court asserted that
Cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (finding that legislators were not deprived of adequate remedies because they could
“repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach . . . .”).

38

39

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 66–67 (asserting that legislative remedy must be an “adequate” remedy).

40

Id. at 67.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 68.

Id. (“Congress’ appropriations power cannot be used to obtain a legislative remedy, such as refusing to
appropriate funds for an Executive Branch program . . . because there are no federal appropriations associated with
the President's receipt of prohibited foreign emoluments.”).
43

See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding the appropriations remedy adequate when
Congress sought to halt military action).

44

45

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 68.

46

Id.

See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[T]he Constitution should not be
construed so as to paint this nation into a corner which leaves available only the use of the impeachment process . . .
.”).

47

48

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 72.

49

Id.

50

Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

51

Id.
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the injury here is entirely based on a loss of political power. 52 Thereafter, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 53
2. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. TRUMP SERIES
As with the Blumenthal cases, the plaintiffs in District of Columbia alleged that President
Trump violates the Emoluments Clause when his businesses receive patronage from foreign
governments. 54 The plaintiffs, the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia, sought to
establish an injury through various theories. 55 The President again sought dismissal, arguing that
the injury is not judicially cognizable, not traceable to his actions, nor redressable by a court
decision in the plaintiff’s favor. 56
The first theory under which the plaintiffs claimed an injury is Maryland’s sovereign
interest in enforcing the terms upon which it entered the Union. 57 The plaintiffs argued that
Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights included reference to its own Emoluments Clause, so the
court should assume that Maryland joined the Union on the condition that the government
enforce the Emoluments Clause. 58 The court found this argument unconvincing, ruling that
states cannot operate as “constitutional watchdogs.” 59
Maryland also claimed a sovereign interest in the tax revenues it receives from the sales
and room rentals on Maryland hotels, restaurants, and event spaces that compete with President
Trump’s properties for government business. 60 The court rejected this argument, holding that
the injuries failed to adequately show causation as lost tax revenues must be supported by
offering “a direct injury in the form of loss of specific tax revenues, which the plaintiffs failed to
do.” 61

52
Id. (“The Members can, and likely will, continue to use their weighty voices to make their case to the American
people . . . . But we will not—indeed we cannot—participate in this debate.”).
53

Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 2020 WL 6037222 (Oct. 13, 2020).

54
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F.Supp.3d 725, 735 (D. Md. 2018) (alleging injuries resulting from violations
of the Domestic Emoluments Clause, but those arguments are not relevant to this discussion).
55

Id.

56

Id. at 732.

Id. at 738. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2056 (2011)
(quoting Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 411 (1995)) (“[S]overeign
interests, in short, are states’ interests in their core ability to govern. They underlie a state's suit against another
government ‘to establish its authority to exercise legislative, executive, or judicial power within a particular territory
or over a particular subject matter.’”).
57

District of Columbia, 291 F.Supp.3d at 738 (first citing Amended Complaint at 33, District of Columbia v.
Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018); and then citing MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 4 (Aug. 14,
1776)).
58

59

Id. at 739 (quoting Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011)).

60

Id. at 739.

61

Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448 (1992)).

8
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Thereafter, the plaintiffs alleged injury to their proprietary interests. 62 Specifically, the
District of Columbia owns the Washington Convention Center, which it argued competes
directly with the Trump properties for event bookings involving foreign governments. 63
Similarly, as a landlord of the Bethesda Marriott Conference Center, Maryland submitted that it
has a financial interest in the Conference Center that competes with Trump-owned entities. 64
On this point, the court noted that the plaintiffs rely on “competitor standing,” under
which they can allege an injury by showing that they compete in the same arena as a party
receiving an illegal benefit. 65 Additionally, for such a claim, lost sales data is not required to
prove a competitive injury; instead, basic economic logic will permit a finding that a plaintiff
will suffer a damage. 66
The court found that, by presenting evidence that their properties compete for the same
type of clientele and by showing that their properties are relatively close to the Trump-owned
properties in the area, the plaintiffs adequately alleged that they compete in the same arena. 67
Further, the court ruled that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged under competitor standing that the
President’s Emoluments Clause violations put them at a competitive disadvantage. 68
Accordingly, the plaintiffs correctly established an injury. 69
Lastly, the plaintiffs asserted, an economic injury to their citizens’ welfare under the
parens patriae doctrine. 70 They claimed that their citizens’ businesses are placed at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the President when he accepts illegal benefits. 71 Mirroring
the earlier proprietary interest analysis, the court found that the competitor standing
jurisprudence moves the plaintiff’s injury beyond mere speculation. 72

62

Id. at 742–43.

63

Id. at 742–43.

64

Id.

65
Id. at 744 (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620–21 (1971)) (concluding that companies had standing
to challenge a regulatory decision because they were injured by the competition the regulation allowed).

Id.; see also In re U.S. Cath. Conf., 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing that plaintiffs utilizing
competitor standing must allege that they compete in the same arena as the unlawfully benefited competitor);
Canadian Lumber Trade All. v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1332 (stating that competitor standing relies on
economic logic to establish causation).
66

67

District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 744.

68

Id. at 745.

69

Id.

See Lexi Zerillo, Note, Who’s Your Sovereign?: The Standing Doctrine of Parens Patriae & State Lawsuits
Defending Sanctuary Policies, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 573, 578 (2018) (describing parens patriae and quasisovereign interest as the same concept).

70

71

District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 746.

72

Id. at 748.
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The court also ruled that the injuries alleged were traceable to the President and
redressable through court action. 73 The court highlighted competitor standing principles to
establish traceability, asserting that losing the chance to compete on equal footing is directly
traceable to the President’s alleged actions. 74 The court rejected the President’s argument that it
is too speculative whether third parties would stop patronizing his entities after a favorable
decision. 75 Instead, the court stressed that redressability requires injuries to be reducible to
“some extent,” not entirely resolved. 76 Ultimately, the court rejected the President’s motion to
dismiss with respect to the Trump operations inside the District of Columbia. 77
Following this defeat, the President sought an interlocutory appeal, which was denied. 78
Thereafter, the President filed a writ of mandamus to force the district court to certify his
interlocutory appeal. 79
The appellate court, in granting the writ of mandamus, then considered the merits of the
President’s motion to dismiss. 80 Beginning with the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs
properly alleged an injury to their proprietary interests, the appellate court emphasized the
speculative nature of such injuries. 81 Although the court recognized the existence of competitor
standing, it firmly stated that competitor standing is “an application of Article III standing
principles, not a relaxation of them.” 82
The court reasoned that this understanding forces one to interpret the alleged injuries as
an overly speculative reading into an individual’s subjective motivation for patronizing the
President’s businesses. 83 Further, the court asserted that the plaintiffs ignored the possibility that
others would avoid patronizing the President’s properties due to him being the president. 84 This
possibility, in tandem with the court’s understanding that injunctive relief would not stop

73

Id. at 749.

74

Id. at 749–50.

75

Id. at 751.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 757.

78

In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2019).

79

Id. at 368.

80

Id. at 372.

81

Id. at 375.

See id. Contra CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8341 (2d ed. 2020)
(explaining that competitor standing is meant as a relaxation of traditional standing requirements). See generally
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178 (responding to In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 367, the court
highlights the many ways in which competitor standing allows for a relaxed application of traditional standing
principles).

82

83

In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 375, 377.

84

Id. at 376.

10
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individuals from patronizing the President’s businesses, led the court to reject the plaintiffs’
proprietary injuries. 85
Shortly thereafter, a rehearing en banc overturned this ruling on writ of mandamus
grounds without addressing the merits. 86 The Supreme Court, hearing the case after President
Trump left office, ordered the case dismissed as moot. 87
3. CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON V. TRUMP SERIES
In this final case series, the Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in Washington
(“CREW”), a non-partisan government watchdog; Eric Goode, a restaurant owner; Jill Phaneuf,
who books embassy functions and other events tied to foreign governments; and ROC United, a
nonprofit member-based organization with over 25,000 restaurant employees and 200 restaurants
brought claims against Trump for violations of the Emoluments Clause. 88
Trump moved to dismiss, which the court considered through a bifurcated analysis in
which it grouped Phaneuf, Goode, and ROC United (“Hospitality Plaintiffs”) and CREW
separately. 89 The court began by considering the Hospitality Plaintiffs’ claim that they face
unfair competitive disadvantage because of the President’s alleged violations of the Emoluments
Clause. 90 The Hospitality Plaintiffs argued that they suffer an injury by competing in the same
arena as the President, who is receiving a benefit in violation of the Emoluments Clause. 91
This court ruled that the Hospitality Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. 92 Ruling that
the injury is too tenuously related to the President’s alleged actions, the court found that the
injury is too speculative. 93 Additionally, it found that such an injury could not be redressed by
court action. 94

85

Id. at 377.

See In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2020) (ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
granting the Presidents interlocutory appeal, making it inappropriate to compel the district court to do so.).
86

See Trump v. District of Columbia, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/trump-v-districtof-columbia/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2022) (covering proceedings).
87

88

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

89

Id. at 184.

90

Id.

Id. at 185; see also CHRISTOPHER M. ERNST, BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. TORT L. § 39:100 (2d ed.), Westlaw (2020)
(“If a plaintiff is a direct competitor with a defendant and an injunction is sought, the ‘injury in fact’ and causation
standing requirements may be satisfied . . . .”).
91

92

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 187.

93

Id. at 186.

Id. (“[T]here is no remedy this Court can fashion to level the playing field for [p]laintiffs as it relates to overall
competition.”).
94
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Turning its attention to CREW's alleged injuries, the court reviewed how an organization
could bring forward a claim. 95 CREW brought its claim under a theory of organizational
standing, under which courts regard an organization as a person seeking to vindicate an
individual right. 96
As a result of the President’s alleged Emoluments Clause violations, CREW asserted that
it had to devote time, resources, and research to obtain financial information about the benefits
he receives from such violations. 97 Additionally, it has needed to devote resources toward
combating the President’s alleged violations. 98 All of these efforts were to the detriment of the
organization and caused injury. 99
The court rejected this argument because the injury CREW sought to establish follows
only from conduct that hinders an organization’s ability to conduct out its normal operations. 100
However, the court held that the very mission of the organization is to combat the activity it
alleges. 101 Its devotion of resources toward this particular case is a matter of prioritization, not a
departure from an organizational mission. 102
Hospitality Plaintiffs Eric Goode and ROC United appealed. 103 Leaning on competitor
standing, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court. 104 It found that
the Hospitality Plaintiffs adequately alleged a viable injury—the supposed increase in
competition resulting from the illegal benefit bestowed on the President. 105 The Hospitality
Plaintiffs allege they compete directly with the President’s businesses and, accordingly, are hurt
when the President receives increased patronage. 106 The adverse effects of higher levels of

95

Id. at 188–89.

96

Id.

Id. at 189 (noting CREW hired two additional senior attorneys for legal research); see also Symposium, An
Organizational Account of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057, 2072 (2019) (citing Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)) (“[T]he Supreme Court recognized a form of organizational standing where
the defendant's conduct has 'perceptibly impaired’ the plaintiff's missional activities . . . .”).
97

98

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 189.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 190–91.

101

Id. at 191.

102

Id at 191–92.

103

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2019).

104

Id. at 191–92.

105

Id. at 190 (highlighting that under competitor standing injury flows from competitive disadvantage).

106

Id. at 190–91.
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competition on a business are fundamental economics, thereby demonstrating a causal
connection between the two. 107
Further, the court rejected the notion that plaintiffs must dispel alternative causes of their
harm.
Such a requirement is too rigorous at the pleading stage, and requiring as much would
effectively prevent any claim of this type from moving forward. 109 The court reasoned that
relying on basic economic logic is sufficient to find causality under competitor standing. 110
108

Lastly, the court ruled that the Hospitality Plaintiffs adequately established
redressability. 111 At the pleading stage, the court only requires that the injury be reduced to
some extent. 112 Since the plaintiffs established causation, it naturally follows that an injunction
preventing such conduct would, at the very least, provide some modicum of relief. 113
III. THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TENSION BETWEEN THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE AND
TRADITIONAL STANDING, AND THE COMPETITOR STANDING SOLUTION
As the case law suggests, the courts disagree on when and how parties can sue over an
Emoluments Clause violation. The injuries that manifest in these claims are often indeterminate
and nonobvious, making uniform application of the elements of standing difficult and leading to
conflicting outcomes. 114
In the relevant case law, there are four types of plaintiffs: (1) congressional plaintiffs
asserting injury to their rights as members of Congress; (2) state plaintiffs asserting injury to
See John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and Separation of Powers, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 628, 642 (2015) (citing Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (“[T]he courts have been
willing to rely on “economic logic” and “basic law[s] of economics” in assuming that the competitors to a particular
litigant will behave in predictable ways that will produce a sufficient injury to sustain standing.”).
107

108

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 191.

109

Id.

Id. at 192; see Duffy, supra note 107, at 642; see also New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (explaining that in competitor standing cases courts are required to accept a chain of causation as
supported by rudimentary economic laws).
110

111

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 194.

Id. at 192; see also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992) (“Even though it is now
too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS
obtained the information on the tapes, a court does have power to effectuate a partial remedy . . . .”).
112

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 198–99; cf. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007)
(upholding redressability where harm reduced to some extent); Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Causation and redressability are
generally implicit in injury-in-fact under the competitor standing doctrine.”).
113

See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 192 (noting that the amorphous nature of the injury could
lead to a reality where it would be virtually impossible to plead a competitive injury). See generally Claire Gianotti,
Ethics in the Executive Branch: Enforcing the Emoluments Clause, 32 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 615 (2019) (suggesting
that recent Emolument Clause cases have tested our nation’s judiciary and strained separation of powers
jurisprudence).
114
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their interests as sovereigns; (3) organizational plaintiffs asserting injury to their organizational
resources; and (4) individual plaintiffs asserting injury to their business interests. 115
Of these four categories, individual plaintiffs with injury to their business interests
present the most troubling constitutional consideration. 116 The class of potential individual
plaintiffs asserting injury to their business is by far the largest and effectively represents the total
amount plaintiffs that can be injured by an Emoluments Clause violation. 117 In cases involving
individual plaintiffs as business owners, the injury resulting from an Emoluments Clause
violation is an injury to the plaintiffs’ ability to compete fairly in the marketplace. 118 Assessing
this injury is difficult.119 As such, the plaintiffs rely on competitor standing to provide a path to
meet constitutional requirements. 120 Without the application of competitor standing, those
parties could not bring their claim. 121
The problem of constitutional enforcement would not be such a salient issue if these
plaintiffs had an alternative route to redress these injures or if an Emoluments Clause violation
presented other redressable injuries. 122 However, currently, an Emoluments Clause violation can
only “injure” individual citizens by forcing them to unfairly compete with businesses in which
federal officials are interested. 123
The original conception of an Emoluments Clause violation, in which an official accepts
a physical gift from foreign governments, affects citizens by thwarting a constitutional

See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 184–85 (containing individual and organization plaintiffs);
Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2017) (containing congressional plaintiffs); District of
Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 732 (D. Md. 2018) (containing state plaintiffs).
115

See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d (elaborating on cases where courts can find standing
even if an injury requires some action by a third party).
116

Cf. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC., 2019 SMALL BUS. PROFILE (2019), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/23142719/2019-Small-Business-Profiles-US.pdf (tabulating millions of small businesses).

117

See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 189–90 (“[The] [p]laintiffs’ alleged injury meets the wellestablished Article III threshold for economic competitors who allege that, because of unlawful conduct, their rivals
enjoy a competitive advantage in the marketplace.”).
118

119

See generally id. (discussing the nature of an Emoluments Clause injury).

120

See WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 82, § 8341.

Cf. Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L. J. 809, 879
(1977) (noting, in the antitrust context, that requiring plaintiffs to assert “direct” injuries would effectively preclude
standing due to the nature of possible injuries).
121

122
See cf. Pennsylvania v. Koehler 229 A.3d 915, 933 (Pa. 2020) (asserting that where there is a right there must be
a remedy).

Cf. District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (“Under the President's interpretation, it would seem that no
one—save Congress which, as discussed momentarily, may never undertake to act—would ever be able to enforce
these constitutional provisions.”); see also Gianotti, supra note 114, at 625 (noting that certain judges find it
inexplicable that the application of traditional standing principles to the Emoluments Clause may render the
President’s actions immune from judicial review).
123
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safeguard. 124 However, it cannot be said that it causes a judicially cognizable injury to citizens
as opposed to current plaintiffs. 125
Further, these citizens do not seem to have alternative recourse to receive redress. 126
Establishing standing without relying on competitor standing may be entirely impossible.127 The
nature of the injury itself appears incompatible with a rigid application of the standing doctrine,
as causation and redressability do not neatly present themselves in the context of an Emoluments
Clause violation. 128
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEABILITY AS A REQUIREMENT
The principle that guides this analysis is the Constitution, and that the provisions therein
must be enforceable. 129 Unfortunately, the Constitution does not directly state this principle. A
reader can only find language slightly resembling this idea in Article VI of the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause. 130
However, this idea finds direct support in what is perhaps the most foundational case in
this nation’s history. 131 In Marbury v. Madison, 132 Chief Justice Marshall firmly declared “that
[i]t is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.” 133 Numerous courts have cited to this principle over the
centuries and solidified it into the bedrock of American jurisprudence. 134 Therefore, if an
Emoluments Clause violation primarily manifests itself as an unfair competitive disadvantage
imposed on individual litigants, and the courts do not provide a path to redress, these provisions
See Meredith M. Render, Fiduciary Injury and Citizen Enforcement of the Emoluments Clause, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 953, 957 (2020) (“The first thesis is that current standing doctrine fails to adequately account for the
fiduciary injury that arises in the context of an emoluments violation.”).
124

125
See generally Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to
Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863 (1996) (describing generalized grievances as mere interests in having
the government follow the law).

Cf. 291 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (noting that if Congress was prohibited from enforcing the constitutional provisions at
issue, then everyone would be prohibited from enforcing them).
126

127

Id.

128

Id.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147, 163 (1803) (“It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right,
when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”).

129

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land . . . .”). See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (“It is obvious that this
obligation is imperative upon the state judges in their official, and not merely in their private, capacities . . . .”).
130

131

Madison, 5 U.S. at 163.

132

Id.

133

See Madison, 5 U.S. at 163; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *115.

134

E.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (citing Marbury).
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are effectively unenforceable, and the courts will contravene a core legal principle in these
cases. 135 The ruling in Marbury makes this an untenable reality. 136
B. THE NATURE OF AN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE “INJURY”
As mentioned, the relevant case law places Emoluments Clause injuries into one of four
categories. 137 In Blumenthal, the plaintiffs alleged an injury to their right to give or withhold
consent to the President—though more generally, it is Congress’s ability to give or withhold
consent from any federal official under the Emoluments Clause—accepting an emolument. 138
This injury, which is solely applicable to Congress members, only applies to those in the House
of Representatives and United States Senate. 139
In District of Columbia, the plaintiffs alleged an injury to their sovereign interests and
their economic rights as business owners. 140 As to the alleged injury to sovereign interests, the
scope of potential plaintiffs is also limited.
In contrast, the injury asserted in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
and, in part, District of Columbia addresses unfair business competition. 141 Therefore, the
number of parties affected can extend to a substantial population. The United States is home to a
staggering thirty-one million small businesses. 142 Through their owners, these businesses
represent the approximate population that could suffer the injury alleged in these cases.
However, if a type of injury has not been recognized as valid by the courts, it would be
entirely irrelevant if the Emoluments Clause could produce such an injury. 143 The injuries in
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and District of Columbia, relating to a

Cf. District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 755 (noting that prohibiting Congress from enforcing the
constitutional provisions will render the provisions unenforceable to all).
135

See Madison, 5 U.S. at 163 (ruling that every individual has a right to claim the protection of the laws when they
have been injured).
136

137
See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2019) (containing individual and
organization plaintiffs); Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2017) (containing congressional
plaintiffs); 291 F. Supp. 3d at 731 (D. Md. 2018) (containing state plaintiffs).
138

Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

See Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (noting that the plaintiffs are members of Congress and the injury
complained of is being prohibited from enforcing the Constitution).
139

District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), rev’d sub nom. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360
(4th Cir. 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020).
140

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated and remanded by
953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2019).
141

U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC., 2019 SMALL BUS. PROFILE (2019), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/23142719/2019-Small-Business-Profiles-US.pdf.; see also id. (noting that small businesses
employ a staggering sixty million individuals throughout the country).
142

143

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1893) (highlighting that every right must have its proper redress).
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business’s competitive vitality, are economic injuries. 144 The courts consistently find this kind
of injury firmly within their purview. 145
So, given the size of the potential plaintiff class of individual plaintiffs, a violation of the
Emoluments Clause has the potential to inflict a valid injury on millions of individuals. 146 The
number of businesses in the United States, alongside the well-known and pervasive
intermingling of private enterprise and politics, indicates that the primary injury of an
Emoluments Clause violation is unfair competition imposed on businesses from elected officials
illegally benefitting from their position of power. 147 Therefore, although the Emoluments Clause
was intended as an anti-corruption measure, embedded into its very structure is a secondary
constitutional mandate to prevent illegally benefitting government officials from unfairly
competing with private businesses. 148
C. TRADITIONAL STANDING AND THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: A RECIPE FOR DISASTER
Although the Emoluments Clause must be enforceable, no set path is required for
enforcement. 149 Although it is unlikely that redress could be sought without competitor
standing, if traditional concepts of standing can be applied with some success, then the
constitutional problem will be avoided.
The case law clarifies that it is difficult for individual plaintiffs to establish standing
without competitor standing. 150 The strict elements of standing often conflict with Emoluments
Clause claims. 151 Although the economic injury which follows an Emoluments Clause violation

District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 743 (D.D.C. 2018); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v.
Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 2019).
144

See Canadian Lumber Trade All. v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Cooper v. Tex.
Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 738 (5th Cir. 2016); Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and
Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2285, 2321 (quoting Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286,
291 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“Economic harm is also frequently treated as clearly sufficient for Article III injury in fact; as
then-Judge Alito of the Third Circuit put it, ‘[w]hile it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula,
economic injury is one of its paradigmatic forms.’”); Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Danvers, 432 F.3d at 293) (“[W]here a plaintiff alleges financial harm, standing ‘is often assumed without
discussion.’”).
145

146

See, e.g., SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC., supra note 142.

See, e.g., Eric Rosenberg, 9 Members of Congress who are also Business Owners, NAV (June 16, 2017),
https://www.nav.com/blog/9-congressmen-who-are-also-business-owners-21072/; see also, e.g., Reity O’Brien,
Blind Justice? Judges Owned Stock in Firms but Ruled on Cases Anyway, (Apr. 28, 2014, 12:34 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/blind-justice-judges-owned-stock-firms-ruled-cases-anyway-n90916.
147

148

See Teachout, supra note 3, at 361–62.

Cf. Kentucky v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202, 213 (Ky. 2018) (discussing a plaintiff’s right to a remedy and
asserting that the failure to provide any viable path for redress is unacceptable).
149

See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2019) (highlighting that all
Emoluments Clause claims may be precluded if competitor standing is not applied).
150

151

Id.
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does neatly fit into the first requirement that injuries be “concrete” and “particularized,” the other
elements are more difficult to establish. 152
The second requirement of standing, causation, outlines a standard that raises ambiguity
regarding an Emoluments Clause injury. Under traditional standing requirements, there must be
a “substantial likelihood” that the injury is traceable of the defendant’s actions and not the result
of some third party. 153 Courts that adhere strictly to this standard have made it common practice
to reject claims that rely on speculation to establish a causal connection between the alleged
conduct and their injury. 154 This model conflicts heavily with the nature of an Emoluments
Clause injury, which, as discussed, often derives from the violator's unfair competitive
advantages. At the pleading stage, parties have not established most of their facts. 155 So, an
injury that is premised on unfair competition within complex marketplaces certainly must depend
on some level of speculation. 156
Additionally, in the context of an Emoluments Clause, the injury is inextricably linked to
third parties’ actions. 157 Customers, or, specific to this context, foreign government officials, are
the actors that bestow the illegal benefit that results in unfair competition. 158 To suggest that the
injury, inherently tied to third parties’ conduct, cannot be caused by the action of third parties
leaves any and all injuries of this type without redress under the traditional standing scheme. 159
As a result, the traditional causation standard fails to adequately meet the needs of litigants
facing an injury resulting from an Emoluments Clause violation. 160
A traditional application of the third element of standing, redressability, also presents
serious problems in the Emoluments Clause context. To establish standing, a party must show

152

See id at 189–90.

See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41–42 (1976)) (“[an injury] fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”)

153

154
E.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 185 (S.D.N.Y 2017) (“[I]t is wholly
speculative whether the Hospitality Plaintiffs' loss of business is fairly traceable to Defendant's ‘incentives.’”);
Simon, 426 U.S. at 45 (saying plaintiffs cannot rely on speculative inferences connect their injury to the defendants
alleged conduct); Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nova
Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005)) (“[A]rticle III does ‘require proof of a substantial
likelihood that the defendant's conduct caused plaintiff's injury in fact.’”).
155

Citizens for Resp., 953 F.3d at 191.

156

Id.

157

Id. at 197.

158

Id.

Id. at 197–98; see also Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (“[A]s we have said, it does not suffice if the injury
complained of is ‘th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court . . . .’”) (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
159

160

See Citizens for Resp., 953 F.3d at 197–98.
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that it is “likely” as opposed to “speculative” that a favorable court decision will remedy the
injury. 161
This issue here, as with causation, boils down to the nature of the injury. When third
parties are involved with an alleged injury, it is impossible to devise a fair remedy that would
certainly change those individuals' behavior. 162 Therefore, again, some level of leeway must be
acceptable if the court wants to address this type of injury. Consequently, the application of
traditional standing principles effectively bars any claim on economic injuries flowing from an
Emoluments Clause violation because the courts will never be able to fashion redress that
negates the injury in its entirety. 163
Unfortunately, as assumed, traditional standing does not permit parties to seek relief from
an Emoluments Clause injury without the competitor standing. Thus, as reasoned above, a
constitutional impermissibility is at play. If the traditional standing doctrine is the only path
available, no path is available at all. Therefore, an alternative must exist.
D. A FAILED ALTERNATIVE: LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
It must be considered whether legislation could address the issue instead of bringing
claims under the Emoluments Clause. Although the question is if legislators can rectify an
individual citizen’s rights, rather than their own as in Blumenthal, the analysis is functionally the
same as it was in Blumenthal. 164
Three legislative remedies exist: (1) Congress can express disapproval of the alleged
conduct through a resolution, (2) utilize their appropriations power to punish the violator, or (3)
Congress can pursue impeachment. 165
The first remedy relies on a reading of the Emoluments Clause that places an affirmative
duty on Congress to provide or withhold consent. This is an incorrect reading of the
Emoluments Clause. 166 It is not incumbent on Congress to express disapproval; 167 it is the
responsibility of a government official to affirmatively seek consent. 168 Requiring Congress to
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (describing that it must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision).

161

162

See Citizens for Resp., 953 F.3d at 198–99.

163

Id.

See generally Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing the ways in which Congress
could address President Trump’s alleged Emoluments Clause violations).
164

Id. at 67–68. But see Stephen L. Carter, The Political Acts of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341, 1348–49 (“[O]ne might argue that because the constitutional system
places so many express checks on presidential power directly in the legislative branch, that branch also ought to
have special authority (if anyone has it) to create new ones. . . . If the Congress can limit the President's authority,
why can't it legislate to punish him directly?”).
165

166

See Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 67.

167

U.S. CONST. art. I §. 9 cl. 8.

168

Id.
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take action places a burden on it that is not legally required to carry. 169 This interpretation also
presupposes that a government official will be more responsive to congressional action than the
U.S. Constitution, a baffling idea that defies reason. 170 The entire basis of this controversy is
that a constitutional mission may go unfulfilled, and requiring Congress to take affirmative
action would lead to that same outcome. 171 Accordingly, it is not adequate.
The appropriations power can potentially provide a remedy; however, courts do not
consider it effective unless the appropriations are directly tied to the problem. 172 No federal
programs are directly tied to the Emoluments Clause, so appropriations cannot be weaponized to
enforce it. 173 Also, in Blumenthal, the controversy only concerned the President, but the scope
of the Emoluments Clause extends beyond the President. 174 Instead, the Emoluments Clause
applies to any “Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under the United States].” 175 As
mighty as it may be, the appropriations power may be ineffective against anyone other than the
President. 176 If a federal official does not govern over programs funded through congressional
appropriations, Congress would need to narrowly tailor an appropriations response, assuming an
effective response could be fashioned. 177 Although a federal official lower in government may be
harder to target, the potential injury he or she may inflict remains the same. 178

169
See id.; see also Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (“The legislation suggested by the President flips this burden,
placing the burden on Members of Congress to convince a majority of their colleagues to enact the suggested
legislation. This is not what the Clause requires.”)

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (“[T]he President does not explain why such legislation, assuming he signed
it, would prevent him from accepting prohibited foreign emoluments.”).

170

Cf. id. (describing how the constitutional mandate of the Emoluments Clause is violated whenever the President
does not affirmatively seek consent from Congress).
171

See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (“We also note that our conclusion neither deprives Members of
Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach) . . .
.”).
172

See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Congress certainly could have passed a law
forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign.”); Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (highlighting that Congress had the option to terminate a challenged executive order if it chose to do so).
173

Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639, 644 (“According to secondary sources, an office of profit
historically referred to a salaried office in which the holder had a proprietary interest, such that the office could be
inherited or sold. An office of trust, by contrast, required ‘the exercise of discretion, judgment, experience and
skill,’ such that the office itself or its assigned duties could not be transferred.”).
174

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see also FOSTER & HICKEY, supra note 3, at 5–6 (citing NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, 33 OP.
O.L.C. at 4) (“OLC, which has developed a body of opinions on the Emoluments Clauses, has opined that the
President ‘surely’ holds an ‘Office of Profit or Trust under the Constitution. OLC opinions are generally considered
binding within the executive branch.”).
175

176

See cf. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. at 68.

177

See cf. id.

178

Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. (applying to any “[p]erson holding any [o]ffice of [p]rofit or [t]rust)”).
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Lastly, the impeachment remedy is inadequate. Although impeachment is a powerful and
wide-ranging tool, it cannot function as the Emoluments Clause's sole enforcement
mechanism. 179 Constitutional jurisprudence does not allow for such a reality. 180 A colorful
example supporting this proposition is found in National Treasury Union Employees v. Nixon in
which the court said, “[m]aking available only the impeachment process in a case such as this
resembles making available a nuclear bomb as the sole weapon to bring down a pheasant.” 181
This remedy must be available, but it cannot be the sole remedy. 182 Thus, Congress is
effectively powerless to address an Emoluments Clause injury.
The failure of traditional standing to provide a path forward and the absence of adequate
legislative remedies requires an alternative solution that will address the looming constitutional
problem. 183
E. A CONSTITUTIONAL HERO: COMPETITOR STANDING

With the failure of traditional standing principles, to adequately address the needs of
litigants seeking to enforce the Emoluments Clause, competitor standing must be applied to
provide a path toward redress. 184
Under traditional standing principles, problems surrounding speculation and third parties'
involvement stifle claims based on unfair competition. 185 The elements of causation and
redressability prevent a party from establishing standing. With competitor standing, however,
the method for establishing causation and redressability is far more flexible. 186
In the appellate decision in Citizens for Ethics & Responsibility, the majority found
causation established through competitor standing. 187 The court’s reasoning relied on the fact
that when competitors allege an injury, the mere chance to compete on equal footing is sufficient
to establish a causal connection between the unfair competition faced and the alleged
179

See Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 68.

180

Id.

181

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

182

See id. at 615.

See FOSTER & HICKEY, supra note 3 (“If the courts lack jurisdiction to enforce the Emoluments Clauses, the
political process would be the remaining avenue to enforce the provisions, such as through legislation or political
pressure. The adequacy of those options is, however, disputed.”).

183

Cf. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 197–998 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing the
ramifications of not employing competitor standing in a variety of contexts including antitrust).

184

185
See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y 2017); In re
Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019).

See WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 82, § 8341 (“Another context in which courts may take a relatively relaxed
approach to causation and redressability involves ‘competitor standing’—i.e., situations in which a plaintiff
challenges a government action for allegedly unfairly titling the economic playing field against the plaintiffs
business interests and in favor of its rivals.”); see also id. (“In 2007's Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Court again took a relatively lax approach to the causation requirement.”).
186

187

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 203 (2d Cir. 2019).
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violation. 188 It is not incumbent on the party to dispel viable alternative theories or specifically
identify business lost pieces as a result of the alleged violation. 189
Also relevant is the court’s understanding that without such a framework, standing would
be nearly impossible to establish. 190 In Emoluments Clause claims, every claim would be
defeated by a defendant merely pointing out that economic losses could be driven by other
factors such as customer preference for the defendant's products, location, or anything else not
tied to the alleged illegal conduct. 191 The court in District of Columbia also solidified this point
when it ruled that it was “not persuaded” by the defendant’s causation arguments because it
would “render impossible” any effort to enforce the Emoluments Clause. 192
Competitor standing also sidesteps the issues regarding redressability. Under competitor
standing, the courts understand redressability that avoids many obstacles to establishing
standing. 193 When using competitor standing, so long as causation is plausibly asserted,
establishing redressability “logically flows” from causation. 194 Combining this notion with the
traditional standing principle that an injury needs to be reduced only to “some extent” creates a
path for establishing redressability. 195 This framework is critical for Emoluments Clause cases
where the competitive disadvantage likely cannot be entirely remedied, and some speculation is
unavoidable when asserting that redress will provide relief. 196
Compared to traditional standing or legislative remedies, competitor standing adequately
addresses the type of injury that Emoluments Clause violations can generate. 197 Applying
competitor standing principles to Emoluments Clause cases allows plaintiffs to overcome the
See id. at 183 (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (explaining that an economic competitor meets the standing requirement when it
alleges the inability to compete fairly).
188

Id. at 191 (“This, however, does not require ruling out all possible alternative explanations of a plaintiff’s injury.
The allegations of fact must plausibly support a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the plaintiff’s injury was the
consequence of the defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions.”).
189

190

Id. at 192.

191
Id. (“Under the standard applied by the district court, it would be virtually impossible to plead a competitive
injury . . . .”).
192
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 749 (D. Md. 2018) (“[A]ccepting the President's third party
argument would render impossible any effort to ever engage in Foreign or Domestic Emoluments Clause analysis.”).
193

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 82, § 8341.

194
Id. (“Because Plaintiffs have successfully alleged a plausible likelihood that President Trump’s conduct caused
their injuries, and the injury is ongoing, it logically follows that relief would redress their injury—at least to some
extent.”).

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 548–49 (2007) (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“[T]he Court's self-professed relaxation of those Article III requirements has
caused us to transgress ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”).
195

196

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 953 F.3d at 194.

Cf. id. at 193 (highlighting how competitor standing can satisfy the causation prong of standing analysis in
Emoluments Clause cases).
197
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hurdles associated with bringing forward such claims. 198 In effect, the competitor standing
doctrine transforms the Emoluments Clause's enforcement from a legal impossibility into a
straightforward process. 199 Therefore, the constitutional problem that circulates the Emoluments
Clause is avoided with the proper competitor standing application. 200
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: PROTECT THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE, EMPLOY COMPETITOR
STANDING
Though rarely litigated before the Trump administration, the Emoluments Clause is an
essential protection for millions of businesses and business owners. 201 Even though the
Emoluments Clause was originally intended to combat the influence of corruption in the
American political system, the nature of the injury that naturally flows from violating the
Emoluments Clause is economical. 202 Federal officials reaping their office's rewards through the
patronage of foreign officials skew the playing field in their favor. 203 Competitive disadvantages
imposed on any business competing with a federal official can be heavy and widespread. 204
Exploring this problem is far more than an academic or constitutional exercise. Instead, its
consequences can leave business owners at the whim of federal officials benefitting from foreign
patronage and illegal preferential treatment. 205
However, the constitutional issue itself is daunting. It is a basic principle that the
Constitution, and its provisions must be enforceable. 206 Since a violation of the Emoluments
Clause primarily threatens individual plaintiffs vis-a-vis competitive business disadvantages,

Cf. id. at 192–93 (showing that plaintiffs need not establish absolute proof of illegal activity being the cause of
unequal competition to have standing).
198

Cf. id. at 194 (showing that redressability logically comes alongside causation under competitor standing for
Emoluments Clause injuries).
199

200

Cf. id. at 192–93 (highlighting how competitor standing can tackle causation prong of standing).

See also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC., supra note 117 (detailing the industry employment rate,
business size, and demographics of small businesses in the United States). See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics
in Wash., 953 F.3d (finding that President Trump’s acceptance of Emoluments potentially placed thousands of
businesses and restaurants at a competitive disadvantage).
201

Bianca Spinosa, Comment, Interpreting Emoluments Today: The Framers’ Intent and the “Present” Problem, 78
MD. L. REV. 998, 1030 (2019) (“[T]his anticorruption interest covered more than a quid pro quo.”).

202

203
See generally District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (finding competitive injury
properly asserted for the District of Columbia and State of Maryland which had financial interests in entities
allegedly placed at disadvantage against Trump-owned properties).

See id.; cf. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. ADVOC., supra note 117 (tabulating millions of small businesses in the
United States).

204

See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing the injury
that can flow from an Emoluments Clause injury).
205

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (stressing the need for every valid injury to have some form of
redress available).
206
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those plaintiffs must be able to seek redress. 207 Otherwise, the Emoluments Clause will be
effectively unenforceable. 208 Accordingly, competitor standing, the only viable theory of
standing applicable to the unfair competition injuries the Emoluments Clause is most prone to
produce, must be treated as a constitutional necessity. 209 Without employing competitor
standing, potential plaintiffs will be unable to satisfy the causation element of standing and
redressability will be almost as difficult. 210 Therefore, failing to employ competitor standing in
Emoluments Clause cases will fatally preclude claims on the issue and potentially leave millions
of individual litigants without recourse through the court system. 211
V. CONCLUSION
The primary legal principle that rights must have redress forces the conclusion that when
the competitor standing requirements are met, courts must permit plaintiffs alleging an
Emoluments Clause violation to have the merits of their case heard.

207

Id.

See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 71 (D.D.C. 2018) (raising concern that impeachment may be only
remedy if plaintiffs cannot bring claim to enforce the Emoluments Clause).
208

See generally Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2019) (highlighting the ways
in which competitor standing allows plaintiffs to bring forward claims to enforce the Emoluments Clause in places
in which traditional standing theories would not).
209

See generally id. (suggesting that without competitor standing principles courts will be unable to hear
Emoluments Clause cases).
210

211

Cf. id. at 191–92.

